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THE EFFECTS OF MALPRACTICE TORT REFORM OF DEFEN IVE MEDICINE

Heather M . O 'Neill
Katherine Hennesy
Department of Bu iness and
Ursinus Co llege
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INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice crises occur across states to differing degrees, thus the proposed
changes in tate tort reforms differ according ly. The primary overt goals of tort reform aim to
address : rising medical malpractice insurance rates, increased frequency and severity of awards,
and the in creased incidence of doctors shuttering offices or fleeing states due to untoward
malpractice environments . A secondary goa l of tort reform is to reduce health care costs attributed
to malpractice costs . Clearly, as malpractice tort reforms are debated in state capito ls and reforms
take place, the effects of the reforms on the goals above can be examined. However, there is an
often ignored implication of reform requiring attention. How do reforms affect doctors' decision
and behaviors in treating patients? Specifically, do doctors change their behavior as the
malpractice enviro nm ent c hanges, and if so, do these changes affect health care costs? Given the
variety of state tort reforms occurring over the last severa l years, we can examine how each one
affects hea lth care cost attributed to changes in physician behavior.
Since the early 1970's econom ists, lawyers, and many within the medical community
have debated the existence of defensive medicine. Using the Office of Technology Assessment
the definitions (OTA, 1994), positive defensive medicine occurs when physicians order additiona l
tests or procedures primarily to avoid malpractice li abi lity. Negative defensive medicine occurs
when doctors avoid certain patients or treatments chiefly out of concern for malpractice liability.
The thrust of this paper deals with positive defensive medicine. Given different malpractice
environment across states, we w itness variation in positive defensive medicine practices leading
to differences in health care expenditures.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we note the existence of defensive medicine .
Next, we discuss malpractice tort reform across states. Lastly, we show which reforms have
demonstrable impacts on defensive medicine and therefore on health care expenditures.

PREVIOUS STUDIES OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE
There are three methods to assess the existence of defensive medicine, and a ll three
have demonstrated its prevalence. In the first method, physicians are asked to estimate how
often they order additional tests and procedures or avoid certain patients. Hickson et a l
(1998) found 80% of pediatricians surveyed practiced positive defensive medicine. OTA
(1994) summarized finding of sixteen surveys and revea led anywhere from 21 to 8 1 percent
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of physicians contended they ordered additional tests out of fea r of litigation. Most recently,
th e Philadelphia Inquirer (2005) reported the Pew Charitab le Trust, working on the Project on
Medical Liability in Pennsylvania , found 93 % of 824 phys ician respondents in s ix high risk
specialties indicated they practiced pos iti ve defensive medicine.
The second method uses physician s urveys to assess physician actions g iven specific
hypothetical clinical s ituation s, thus enabling focu s on physician specia lties and clinical
scenarios in w hi ch defensive med icin e i a concem. In 1993 , the OTA conducted clinical
surveys of obstetricians, gy neco logists and surgeo ns and revealed the percentage of
respondents who chose " malpractice concerns" as the primary reason for administering a
clinical action ranged from 4.9% for back pain scenario to 29% for head trauma, with an
average of 8% across the study (OTA, 1994). The estimated aggregate cost of defensive
Cesarean deliveries was $8.7 million in 1991 , compared to the aggregate cost of defensive
diagnostic radiology of the head for American ages 5 to 24 to be $45 million (OTA, 1994).
The third method, health care utilization studies, mitigates the biases associated with
the hypotheti ca l nature of the above phys ician surveys. Patient hospital records are linked to
patient hea lth status, hospital demographics and geographic considerations to assess the
utili zation and cost of defensi ve tests . Here, the data are real, not hypothetical, thus avoiding
possible bias in the phys ician responses. Additionally, since information is kept on each
patient, the sample size can be extensive and robust. Localio et al (1993) found in the case of
Cesarean deli veries, patients in a hospital with high frequency obstetric malpractice claims
were 32% more likel y to und ergo a Cesarean deli very than patients in a hospital with low
claim frequency. Kington (1994) and Baldwin et al (1995) also witnessed defensive medicine
in obstetrics practices.

LEGISLATURES ENACT TORT REFORM IN RESPONSE TO MALPRACT[CE CRISES
Literature on malpractice has identified two periods prior to today in which the
malpractice system was in crisis: one in the mid-1970 's and one in the 1980 's. Both led to
s ignificant increases in malpractice premiums and heightened concerns of doctors and hospitals .
In response to the crises, some states enacted tort reforms . The goal of reform following the
1970's crisis was threefold. Legislators wanted: to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring
non-negligent suits to trial; to define standards of care and consent; and, to limit the total costs
associated with plaintiff awards for successful suits (Barker, 1992).
Several indirect reforms , those indirectly affecting monetary awards, were enacted. Prior
to 1970, most states had statute of limitations with discovery rules , indicating statutes did not
begin until after the injury was discovered . By allowing claims to be filed several years after the
date of injury, it contributed great uncertainty to malpractice insurance pricing. To reduce
uncertainty, 34 states shortened their statute of limitations. Most statute reforms reduced the total
limitations pe riod to 2-3 yea rs and decreased the length of time permitted for injury discovery
(Barker, 1992.)
Anothe~ i~1direct reform concerned the doctrine known as res ispa loquitur, "the thing
speaks for itse lf." This doctrine originally permitted juries to infer negligence based on the
premise the defendant has exclusive control over the instrument causing injury, and that the
instrument does not injure when used in a non-negligent manner. Reforms of this doctrine defined
circumstances under which the doctrine applied . Similarly, many states defined the standard of
care physicians were expected to provide. By defining acceptable standards of care, legislators
essentially codified professional tandards into a legally binding form rather than an honor code.
There were also several reforms enacted to limit malpractice awards directly . After 1975,
nine states enacted reforms capping malpractice awards values; seven of the states capped total
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da mage award while two slates capped on ly non-economic dama ge of pain and suffering
(Barker, ( 992). everal s tates created Patient ompen ation Fund (P F) . Ph y ician in the e
tates were res ponsible fo r awards up to a certa in dol lar amount, after which the PCF paid the
rema inder.
Mod ificatio n of the co llatera l source ru le was another direct reform enacted.
O ri g ina ll y, thi s rule pro hi bited ev ide nce of co llatera l award ource to be intr duced to the jury.
Refo rm a ll owed j uri es to co nsider, and o metimes mandated, ju ries to lower awards when
pla intiffs had co ll atera l awa rd so urces . T hese co llateral so urces cou ld include other physicians,
hos pi ta l or insurance co mpa ni es. By enacting such reforms, plai ntiff: cou ld no longer receive
du pli ca te ma lpracti ce awa rds fro m mul tiple so urces.
To redu ce costs as ociated w ith litiga ti on, th ree majo r reforms were enacted . F irst, some
tates mand ated pretri a l sc reening requiring potentia l cases scree ned by a pa ne l before proceed ing
to tri al. Cases dee med un wo rth y did no t reach tri a l, thus e liminating unnecessary tria l expen es .
T hirteen s tates created prov i io ns fo r arbitra ti on, e ither vo lun ta ry or mandatory, between pretria l
di scovery and tri al to e limin ate ex pense assoc iated w ith tr ia l (Ba rker, 1992). U nder mandatory
arbitrati on, third party decis ions were binding and could no t be appea led . A third reform capped
co ntingency fees fo r atto rney representati o n, limiting the percentage of th e awa rd co llected by
lawyers foll ow ing successfu l tri a ls.
A n a ltern ati ve way of class ify in g re forms is by th e impact th ey have o n phys ic ian
behav io r, e ither directl y a nd immedi ate ly or indirectly over time. T he li ke lihood of a ph ys ic ian
makin g a pay ment in a case of presumed negli gence is the probab ili ty of be ing sued times the
magnitud e of the awa rd . We catego ri ze refo rms redu c ing th e li ke lihood of being sued, thu the
frequ ency of being sued, as direct impacts s ince th ey w ill immed ia te ly a lter ph ys ician behav ior.
There are fo ur primary to rt re forms th at ca n directl y impact behav ior: use of arbi tratio n boa rds,
introdu cti on o f pre- tri a l screenin g, res tri cted co ntin gency fees and statute of limi tations redu ctions.
If ph ys ic ians beli eve the ir actio n w ill be rev iewed by obj ecti ve experts to determin e if negligence
occurred , th ey w ill be less inclined to practi ce defens ive medi cine, rega rdl ess of the s ize of the
awa rd . Res tri ctin g co ntingency fees w ill redu ce th e li ke lihood of being sued beca use attorneys
w ill mo re ca re full y scrutini ze w hi ch ca es to co ntes t. Reduc ing the statute of lim itati ons redu ces
th e probability of being s ued by limiting cases to time ly observa bl e injuries or dea ths.
Other re form s redu ce th e expected awa rd s to c la imants o r seve rity of the claim, thu the
ex pected payo ut by th e phys icians, and we catego rize the e as indirect impacts. Since doctors
have ma lpracti ce insurance, the payo ut i ge nerall y paid by th e insurance co mpany leav ing s mall ,
if any, o ut-o f-p ocket ex penses by the phys icians. Thi s sugges ts less immedi ate changes in
behav io r by doctors du e to th e third party pay ment. Tho ug h large insurance payouts lead to hi g her
future ma lpracti ce premiums for docto r , thi s out-of-pocket ex pen e is incurr d over time and
leads to changes in behav ior over a longer time peri od, such as doctors leav ing practi ces o r s tates.
Capping damages, ins titutin g co llatera l so urce rul es, c reatin g PCF's, allow ing for peri odi c, not
lump sum, payments and harin g bl ame throu gh j o int and several liability c lauses will redu ce th e
severity of th e c laim 's award and alter ph ys ic ian behav ior indirectl y.

LINKfNG D EFEN SIV E M E DIC INE AND TORT REFORM
Kess ler and Mc le iIan 's ( 1996) stud y exa min ed how tort re fo rm and malp racti ce
environments impact de fens ive medi c ine. The auth ors used long itudin a l da ta o n Medi care
pati ents fro m 1984 , 1987, and 1990 w ho we re trea ted fo r acute myoca rdi a l infarcti on (A MI)
and new ischemi c hea rt di sease (fHD). They co mpared hos pita l expenditures, holding health
outcomes constant, across states w ith to rt reform to tho se w ithout re fo rm. Hospita l
ex penditure grow th was 2-6% lower in re fo rm states for A MI w ith li ghtl y g rea ter differences
for fHD . Ex penditures in sta tes ado pting direct re form s, those des igned to redu ce awa rd s,
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declined 5.3% relative to non-reforming states and expenditures in states with indirect reforms
increased 1.8% relative to non-reforming states. Overall , the ir results show direct reforms
reduce expenditure g rowth without increasing mortality whil e indirect reforms have no
ub tantial effects on expenditure or mortality.

METHOD
We develop a healthcare utili zation multiple reg ression model to discover how state
malpractice environments influence the 'Practice of positive defensive medicine. The scope of the
study is limited to patients aged 18-65 with skull fractures, since skull fractures are associated
with a high leve l of risk and uncertainty, making it like ly defensive medicine occurs. We contend
reductions in state malpractice pressures will diminish the level of defensive medicine associated
w ith these patients and result in substantial cost savings. Unlike Kessler and McClellan ' s (1996)
use of direct or indirect reforms , we study the individual impacts of twelve reforms . We examine
how much of an impact the reforms have on defensive medicine according to our taxonomy of
direct versus indirect impact on physician behavior.
An interview with surgeon Dr. Stanton Miller (2003) highlights how defensive medicine
occurs with head trauma patients. He contends generally the only tests needed to evaluate a
pati ent admitted with a head injury are a comprehensive neurological exam along with a
comprehensive examination of the rest of the body. However, due to fear of liability, physicians
frequently order additional tests such as Computerized Tomography tests (CT scans) or Magnetic
Reso nance Imagery (MRl) tests. These tests have an approximate cost of $400 and $1,000 to
$ 1,500, respectively. Physicians may also call neurolog ists in for consultations, tacking on
another $250 to the bill. Finally, if a phys ician suspects that a patient has a traumatic head injury,
he or she will probably put the patient in the [ntensive Care Unit overnight ($2,000+) so that the
patient's neurological conditions can be monitored for internal bleeding and other injuries
(Miller). Thus, a patient treated for a head injury ma y have over $3,500 in additional charges due
to defensive medical practices.
The dependent variable, total patient expenditures, is used as a means of assessing the
level of defensive medicine practiced in each state. To distinguish the effect of state malpractice
environmental factor from other factors contributing to variations in patients' total expenditures,
independent variable vectors accounting for patient and hospital demographics have been
includ ed. Dummy variables for various tort re form serve as identifiable measures of differences
in state malpractice environments.
Variables within the patient and hospital demographic vectors can account for differences
in patients ' hospital expenditures. Though each variable will have its own individual impact on
charges, each can be held constant to examine the individual role of tort reform on total charges.
For example, patient's length of stay, number of diagnoses , and number of medical procedures
pos itively impact charges, but these can be held constant serv ing as control variables to assess the
tort reform impacts. The other general patient demographics are age, gender, patient income and
payment source. The hospital demographic vector includes variables describing hospital control,
size, location, and teaching status.
Twelve dummy variables for various tort reforms are used in the model , as shown in
Tables I and [1. We hypothesize physicians working in states with tort reform that directly or
indirectly impacts physician behavior will practice less defens ive medicine than their counterparts
in non-reform states, leading to less total patient expenditure. Thus, the tort dummy variables are
expected to have negative regression coefficients.
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D ATA
T he data co me from two so urces. Informatio n on tota l pati ent expenditures patient
demograp hi cs, and hosp ita l demog rap hi cs, for patients w ho had primary, secondary, or terti ary
di agnoses of skull fractures are de ri ved fro m the 2000 Nationw ide Inpati ent ampl e, part of the
Hea lthcare Cos t and Util ization Project spo nsored by the Agency for Health care Re earch and
Q uali ty.1 T his data set co ntains 7,450,992 in patient hospital stays from 994 hospital s in 28 states.
To make patients as similar as poss ible, severa l re trictions are p laced on the patients considered
in thi s study.
Age is res tri cted to pa ti ents 18 to 65 old for two reasons. F irst, minors are
e liminated because th ey are ubj ect to di fferent malpractice statutes of lim itations in many states.
econd, th e e lderl y are eliminated because literatu re on ma lpractice suits has shown that
successful e lderl y c laimants are awa rded low do llar amoun ts du e to the ir lesser li fe expectanc ies.
We e liminated outliers fo r length of stay and number of diagnoses ; we on ly chose patients with
fewer th an e leven days in the hosp ital and fewe r th an eleven d iagnoses with th eir hospita l
enco unter. The total charges obtained from the NIS were defl ated by regional o r state CPIs to
acco unt for vari ations in the price of medi cal ca re serv ices .2 Due to restri ctions and m issing data,
our sa mple s ize is limited to 23 states and app rox imate ly 3492 pa ti ents.
The seco nd source of data used for state to rt laws co me fro m the A merican Medica l
Associati on Ad vocacy Resource Center' s state law charts on li ability refo rm . Dummy var iab les
fo r the ma lpract ice tort laws listed in Table I are crea ted for each state and are presen ted in Tab le
II. The statute of limitati ons va ri ab le is th e max imum numb er of yea rs durin g w hi ch a cla imant
ca n co mmence a medica l li abili ty acti on. Due to laggi ng time effects between w hen refo rms are
enacted and w hen ph ys ic ians be hav iora ll y res po nd to these reforms, a two-yea r w indow of time is
permitted fo r each refo rm . Hence, refo rms ena cted after 1997 are not considered in th is ana lysis of
2000 pati ent data.

I The di agnoses codes for skull fractures are based on th e ICD -9CM codes va lid fo r the
pati ent 's di scha rge date and inc lude: 800.00-800 .99 (Fracture of skull vault), 80 1.00-80 1.99
(F racture of skull base), and 803 .00-803.99 (Other and unqu a lifi ed s kull fractures) . Informati o n
on ICO-9-C M codes was obta ined from a top sSea rch ICO-9 Tria l o n e- mds.co m and UMEA
U ni versity's o nline directory ofl CD-9-CM Intern ati onal Coding Sta ndard .

Kansas was selected as the base state in thi s analys is because of its base line numb er of
ma lpracti ce tort re forms. cpr data for the yea r 2000 w~ re. obta ined fro m th e U rb an Co nsumer
Seri es " All He ms" cpr index ava ilable on Bureau of Labor Stati sti cs' website. If data fo r a
metropoli ta n area w ithin a given state were ava ilabl e or the state was c ited as hav ing a cpr va lue
co rresponding to a metropolitan area in a nea rby state, this cpr va lue was used . If data fo r severa l
metropolitan areas w ithin a state o r co rres po nding to a state were ava ilable, the average of these
va lues were used . For states in whi ch there were no co rres ponding metropoli ta n areas associated ,
the regional (N orth eas t, Mid wes t, South , or Wes t) "All Items" U rban CPI va lue was used . This
meth od o f cpr base lining is th e bes t ap prox imati o n th at ca n be made, g iven th e limi ted amount of
C PI inform ati o n ava il able fo r loca ti ons around th e nati on.
2
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Tab le [: Malpractice Tort Laws Used in Analysis
Reform

Description of reform

Arbitration (Permitted)
Arbi tration (Mandatory)
Pre-judgment

Arb itration is permitted, but not mandated.
Arbitration is mandated .
Claimants need to obtain a certifi cate of affidav it of merit wi thin a
certa in amo unt of time in order to pursue medi ca l li ab ility actio n.
The proportion of an award that an attorn ey can contractua lly charge
is statutorily capped at a specifi c level.
The max Imum number of years (from incident occurrence,
discovery, or the max imum time limit) during which a claimant can
co mmence an action for med ica l liability
Damages payab le in a malpractice suit are statutoril y reduced by all
or part of the dollar value of co llateral-source payments to the
plaintiff.
Either noneconomi c, total damages , or both types of damages are
capped at a statutorily established dollar amount.

Contingency Fee Cap
Statute of Limitations

Co ll ateral Source Rule
Reform
Damage Caps
(noneconomi c or tota l
damaKes)
Damage Ca ps (puniti ve
damages)
Joi nt
and
Several
Liab ili ty Rule Reform

Periodic Payment of
Awards (Perm itted)
Periodi c Payment of
Awards (Mandatory)
Physician
Co mpensation Fund

Puniti ve damages are capped at a statutorily estab li shed dollar
amount.
The Joint and Several Liab ili ty rule IS abolished either for
non eco nomi c or tota l damages in all claims, such that damages
payable in a malpractice suit are sta tutorily allocated in proportion to
the tortfeaso rs' degree of fau lt.
Part or all of the damages are permitted to be disbursed in the form
of an annui ty that pays out over time.
Part or all of the damages must to be di sbursed in the form of an
annuity that pays out over time.
A state-admini stered excess malpracti ce liability insurance program
ex ists for phys icians.
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Tab le II : State To rt Coding Matrix as of 2000

State Arbit Prejudge C ontFeeCap S ta tLim Co lISoRef Dam C ap JntSevL P eri odP ay P CF

AZ

0

0

0

2

\

0

I

0

0

CA

1

0

\

3

1

\

0

1

0

CO

\

1

0

3

1

\

1

2

0

CT

1

0

\

3

1

0

\

\

0

FL

\

1

0

4

0

0

1

\

1

IL

0

1

\

4

1

0

0

\

0

KS

1

\

0

4

0

1

1

1

0

KY

0

0

0

\

0

0

1

1

0

MA

0

0

\

7

I

\

0

0

0

MD

2

1

0

5

0

1

0

I

0

MO

0

\

0

10

0

I

0

1

0

NC

2

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

0

NJ

0

\

\

2

1

2

1

0

0

NY

\

\

\

2. 5

I

0

1

2

0

OR

0

0

I

5

0

0

0

0

0

PA

\

0

0

7

0

2

0

1

1

SC

1

0

0

6

0

0

0

0

1

TN

\

0

0

3

J

0

1

0

0

TX

\

1

0

2

0

2

1

0

0

VA

2

0

0

2

0

\

0

\

0

WA

2

0

0

8

I

0

0

\

0

WI

1

0

1

5

\

1

1

\

I

GA

\

\

0

5

0

2

0

0

0
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STATE TORT CODING KEY *

* Al l reforms took effect in prior to 1998 in order to allow for lag time between tort reform
enactment and physician behavior change .
Arbitration:
Arbit= 0 if there are no provi s ions for arbitration.
Arb it= 1 if there arb itratio n is permitted (vo luntary) .
(In regre sion ana lysis transformed to : ArbitVol= 1.)
Arbit= 2 if their arbitratio n is mandatory .
(In regression ana lys is transformed to : ArbitMand= 1.)

Pre-judgment measures:
PreJudge= 0 if c laimants do not need to obtain a certificate/affid av it of merit within a
certa in amount of time in order to pursue a medi ca l li ability action .
PreJudge= L if claimants must (mandated) fil e a certifi cate/affid av it of merit within a
certain amount of time in order to pursue a medical li ability action .

Contingency Fee Caps:
ContFeeCap= 0 if contingency fees are not capped (Thi s includes HI, lA, and W A where
courts must approve/determine reasonable contingency fees.)
Co ntFeeCap= 1 if contingency fees are capped.

Statute o[Limitations:
StatLim= #. This number is the max imum number of yea rs (from incident occurrence
or discovery) during w hi ch a claimant can commence an action for medi ca l
liab ility. In cases w here there were different time limits for occurrence,
discovery, or a maxi mum statute of limitation s I have used the maximum time
limit.

Collateral Source Rule:
Co lI SoRef= 0 if the co ll atera l source rul e is in effect Uuries cannot consider cla imants'
externa l co mpensation sources).
Co liS oRef= 1 if the co llateral source rul e has been reformed such that juries are permitted
to cons ider c laimants' external co mpensa tion sources.

Damage Caps:
DamCap= 0 if there are no caps on any type of damage award.
DamCap= I if th ere are caps on noneconomic/total damages . (In regression analysis
transformed to : DamCapNT= I.)
DamCap= 2 if there are caps on punitive damages only (In regress ion analysis
transformed to : DamCapPun= 1.)

Joint and Several Liabilitv Rule:
JntS evL= 0 if joint and several liability is in effect Uoint tortfeasors are each responsible
for th e entire judg me nt)
JntS evL= 1 if joint and several liability has been reformed such that damages are
allocated in proportion to tortfeasors ' degree of fault)

Periodic Payment o[damages:
PeriodPay= 0 if there are no provisions for periodic payments of damages
PeriodPay= L if periodic payment of damages is permitted, but mandated (In regression
analysis transformed to : PerPayPerm = 1.)
PeriodPay= 2 if periodic payment of damages is mandated (In regression analysis
transformed to : PerPayMand = I .)

Ph ysician Compensation Funds:
PCF= 0 if the state did not have a patient compensation fund in 2000.
PCF= 1 if the state had a patient compensation fund in 2000.
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RESULTS
O rdin ary least sq uares regress ion res ults correctin g for heteros kedasti city us ing White's
test are repo rted in Tab le Ill. T he mea n total charge for pati ents w ith skull fractures was $2 1, 127,
in 2000 do llars, w ith an adj usted R -square of .49 . S ince the purpose of the paper is to eva luate the
refo rm impacts, di scuss ions of the nu merous s tatisticall y s ignifi cant co ntro l variab les are not
included ? A ll but one tort refo rm, vo lun ta ry arbitration, have a s ignificant impact on th e practice
of defens ive medi cin e, th oug h no t a ll va ri ab les yie ld th e expected s igns on their coe ffic ients.
Three of th e fo ur direct impacts ind icate s ignifica nt savi ngs from to rt reform . T he reform
w ith th e larges t nega ti ve coefficient, indicatin g th e most important reform in terms of savings
from redu ced de fens ive med ic ine, is mandato ry arbitration. Hav ing a prov is io n for mandatory
arb itration redu ces to ta l skull fracture charges by $ 12, 177 , a s igni ficant amount compared to th e
mean of$2 1, 127. T his res ul t supports th e th eory that physicians fea r ma lpractice s ui ts going to
court and practi ce less defens ive medi cine w hen suits must first be assessed by an arb itratio n
board . Interestin g ly, hav ing a vo luntary arbitrati on po li cy has no impact, imp ly ing the po licy
needs to have teeth to be effective. Simil ar to mandatory arbitratio n, pre-j udg ment meas ures
reduce charges by $5, 174.99 , imp lyin g ph ys ic ians w ill practice less defensive medicine if states
screen claims before they ca n proceed to co urt. It appea rs docto rs practice s ig ni fica ntly less
defens ive medi c ine kn ow ing arbitrati on or screening boards cull thro ugh cases fi rst. Las tly,
enactin g co ntin gency fee caps, w hi ch pres umabl y reduce the frequ ency of claims, reduce charges
by $4,534. 50.
Three o f the indirect impacts also redu ce pati ent expendi tures . Mand ato ry periodi c
payments redu ce c harges by $7,842.9 1 sugges ting phys icians fee l less threatened w hen pay ments
are disbursed over time rath er th an a lump sum. The magnitud e of this coefficient indi cates it is
th e seco nd most cos t sav ing refo rm. Hav ing phys icians res pons ible fo r the sa me propo rtion of
damages as th eir acti ons contribute in a med ica l liability case us ing j o int and severa l liab ili ty rules
s ig nifi ca ntl y redu ces charges by $2,474.77 . The ex istence of sta te pe F ' s reduces defensive
medi ca l ca re by $ 1,856.49 . These latter two reform s have less bang-per-bu ck as th e d irect impacts
above.
Statute of limi ta tio n re fo rms have a s ignificant, but un ex pected, effect on to ta l charges .
For each add itiona l yea r a pati ent is abl e to take medi ca l li abili ty acti on, there is a $ 1,504 .69
decrease in tota l charges fo r skull fracture pati ents . T heo ry predi cts that a llow ing pati ents an
additi onal yea r to ta ke acti on w ill in crease the volume of ma lp racti ce claims fil ed, thu s cause
phys ic ians to prac ti ce mo re defe ns ive medi cin e; if a ph ysician knows th at a pa ti ent has more yea rs
in w hi ch he or s he ca n fil e a ma lpracti ce suit, th en perhaps the phys ic ian ord ers more tests to
p rocect fro m a suit cl a iming the proper sta ndard of ca re was not met. Thus, altho ug h the length of
time to bring a sui t is s ig nifi ca nt, th e real iss ue is th e ph ys ic ian 's ri sk of being sued . It is poss ible
that a ri s k pl atea u or peak ex ists for statutes of limitati ons such th at after a certain number of
yea rs, the probability of a ma lpractice c laim be ing fil ed e ither plateaus or drops dra ti ca ll y. More
resea rch on the re lati onship between de fens ive med icine and statute of limitations reducti ons is
needed before firm co nclusions can be drawn.
Four indirect impact re form s show results in contrast w ith ex pectatio ns. T he co llateral
so urce rul e, periodi c payments, and damage cap re form s s ignificantl y increase tota l charges,
sugges tin g more de fens ive medi c ine. Hav ing a co ll atera l so urce reform increases s kull fracture

For example, T able III indicates for each additiona l da y of hospitali zation, tota l charges
in crease $3, 191 .70, ceteri s paribu s. Similarl y, each additional procedure increases tota l charges
by $ 3,716.70, w hereas an addition a l diagnosis raises patient charges by $ 191.68.
3
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Table III: Regression Results (t-va lu es in parentheses)3
Variab les
Intercept

Coefficien t
Estimates b
-$ 130.98
(-0 .06)

Patient Demographics

(AGE) : Age
(FEMALE): Gender
(MEDICAID) : Medicaid
Insurance

(PRIVATE): Pri vate Insura nce
(TWENTYFJVE): Income
$25,000-34 ,999

(THfR TYFI VE) : Income
$35 ,000-44,999

(FORTYFJVE) : Inco me
$45 ,000 +
Patient Hospital Stay
Demographics

(LOS): Length of Stay
(NDX) : Number of Diagno es
(NPR): Number of
Procedures

-$ 130.98
(-0 .83)
-$ 17.34**
(-2.7 1)
$3 ,596 .63* *
(2 .85)
$30.30
(0.06)
-$1 ,535 .95
(-1.54)
-$1,410.69
(- 1.50)
$ 1,84 1. 90
( 1. 90)*

$3 , 19 1. 70***
(25 .59)
$19 1. 68
( 1.59)
$3,716 .70***
( 15.88)

Variab les

Malpnctice Tort Law Reforms
(ARB fTVOL) : ArbitrationVoluntary
(ARBfTMAND): Arbitratio nMandatory

(PREJUDGE) : Pre-judgment
(CONTFEECAP): Conti ngency
Fee Cap

(STATLIM): Statute of Limitations
(COLLSOREF): Co ll atera l Source
Rul e

(DAMCAPNT) : Damage CapsN oneconom ic/Total
(DA MCAPP UN) : Damage CapsPuniti ve
(JNTSEVL) : Joint and Severa l
Liability

(PERPAYPERM) : Peri odi c
Pay ment- Permitted

(PERPAYMAND) : Peri od ic
Payment- Mandatory

(PCF) : Physician Co mpensatio n
Fund

Hospital Demographics

(TEACH) : Teaching facility
(URBAN): Urban location
(URBAN): Large size
(PUBLIC) : Public facility
(VOLUNTA Ry) : Non-profit
facil ity

$654.39
(0 .64)
$7,063.70***
(8.29)
$3,954 .6 1***
(7 .22)
$2,686 .13**
(2.29)
$2,7 14.92**
(2.00)

$686 .8 1
(0.67)
-$ 12, 177.00***
(- 10.40)
-5,174 .99***
(-6 . 18)
-4,534.50***
(-5 .27)
-1,504.69***
( -8.98)
$3,866 .88***
(4.73)
$2,584.30***
(3 .97)
$2,226.01**
(2.0 1)
-$2,474.77**
(-2 .69)
$2,775 .17***
(3.48)
-7 ,842 .91***
(-5 .32)
-$ 1,856.49**
(-2.03)

Adju ted R2 = 0.4862
Co ndition Ind ex = 35.9 1244
Dependent Mean (tota l charges) = $2 1, 127

Notes:
t-va lues were produced us ing White 's consistent estimators of the va riance.
b All coefficient estimates use 2000 dollars.
* Si gnificance at the 10% confidence leve l; ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level

a

Coefficient
Estimates b
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patient charges by $3 ,866 .88. Caps on non-economi c or total awards increase charges by
$2,584.30, whi le caps on punitive damages increase charges by 2,226 .01 . Permittin g periodi c
payments in crease total charges by $2,775 . 17. A poss ible explanation for th ese res ults is they
re ult from an endogeno us relationship between tort re form s and the degree of state malpracti ce
crises. Tort reforms are often enacted in state in reaction to a malpractice cri sis occurrin g. These
crises , often manifested through large annua l physician malpractice premium increases that can
lead to declines in practicing physicians , lead to reforms concerned with redu cing th e economi c
impact on physicians. A ll four indirect impacts noted above attempt to reduce doctor outlays .
Thus, the signifi ca ntl y positive coefficients on these four variables may reflect this endogenous
relationship between states in malpractice crises and the reforms they enact, and th e fact that it
takes time for the reforms to beco me effective. For examp le, as of 2000, Pennsylvania, N ew
Jersey, Texas and Georgia, for states deemed in crisis by the American Medical Association ,
allo wed caps on punitive damages o nl y (American Medical Assoc iation , 2005) . Additionall y,
total charges in th ese states are hi gher than average. The positive coefficients may reflect
linge rin g crises effects that the reforms have not yet fixed .

CONCLUS IONS
There is strong ev idence th at va ri atio ns in state malpractice env ironments sign ificantly
influence the leve l of defensive medicine practiced by physicians on sku ll fractu re patients .
Specifically, states enacti ng refo rms directly impacting doctors' behavior w itness reductions in
patient expenditu res on sku ll fractures . States requiring mandatory arb itratio n reduce charges o n
ave rage by $ 12, 177, over half the mea n hosp ital charge for skull frac ture patients. Pre-judgment
measures save $5, 175 o n average. We co ntend th ese reforms most directly affect doctors'
behaviors s in ce doctors have more co nfidence in a sys tem that eschews frivolous or unwarranted
cases. Capping atto rney fees save $4,534 per skull fracture patient presum ab ly by redu ci ng the
expected numb er of suits filed . Additionally, states mand atin g periodic payment of awards
witness sig nificantly reduced charges of $7,843 per skull fracture patient, though we posit this
indirectl y, or less immediately, alters ph ys ic ian beha vior. In contrast, damage caps and co ll atera lso urce rul e reforms, designed to redu ce out-of-pocket costs to physicians, do not reduce defensive
med icine costs.
The results are consistent with some of Kessler and McClellan 's (1996) findin gs, thou g h
contrary to others. Both studies find that joint and several li ability rul es and mandatory periodic
payments reduce patient expenditures. Kes sler and McCle llan 's ( 1996) res ults, however, show
damage caps reduce exp·enditures, contrary to findin gs here. Danzo n ( 1986) find s damage caps
decrease claims severity, but not their frequency. If this is the case, then ph ys ic ians do not
perceive a reduced likelihood of being sued with damage caps in place and thus do not practice
less defensive medi cine, which would contradict Kess ler and McCle llan 's findin gs. The pos iti ve
coefficient on damage caps here is not inconsistent with Danzo n, and as mentioned previously, the
endogeniety between hi gher medical costs malpractice crises may best explain it.
Kraus (1996) estimates approximately 2 million head injuries occur each year. If only
half are skull fractures for people aged 18-65 enacting mandatory arbitration could save over $12
billion in skull fracture defensive medical practices. Considering this estimate represents savings
from less than one percent of the total patient population, total defensive medicine costs across
numerous injuries and illnesses are potenti ally tremendous .
Policy makers should seriously consider the impact of state malpractice tort reforms on the
practice of positive defensive medicine to reduce health care expenditures. Tho e reforms directly
impacting physician behavior offer enormous savings in skull fracture diagnoses. Given previous
studies in obstetrics noting the existence of positive defensive medicine, it is likely a study such as
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ours us ing obstetrics data would al 0 find significant savi ngs. Reforms designed to reduce the
frequency or like lihood of frivolous law uit offer the greatest savings. Some reforms attemptin g
to r duce the everity of awards, such as joint and severa l liability rules, mandated periodic
payment and PCF' , offer les er sav ing on average. Damage caps and co llatera l source rules do
not appear to reduce po iti ve de fen s ive m dicine, though they may impact physicians moving
practices or avo idin g certa in ty pes of practices.
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